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The euro area sovereign debt crisis made it clear how, when the 
cycle turns down, the absence of sound public finances may 
exacerbate budgetary difficulties, the correction of which may 
ultimately require the adoption of fiscal adjustment measures 
which deepen the recession. With a view to the creation of 
budgetary headroom to mitigate these risks and ensure the long-
term sustainability of Member States’ public finances, the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) establishes procedures for the 
supervision of national budgetary policies.1 The purpose of this 
Box is to describe how compliance with these procedures affects 
the Spanish fiscal policy stance in the current economic situation.
There are two tools in the SGP framework which allow follow-up of 
Member States’ public finances according to their situation. First, 
if the budget deficit is above 3% of GDP and/or public debt 
exceeds 60% of GDP and GDP is not being reduced to the relevant 
threshold at a sufficient pace,2 the so-called “corrective 
component” is applied and the economy is said to be subject to 
an excessive deficit procedure. Second, when the government 
deficit and debt are not considered excessive under the 
aforementioned criteria, Member States become subject to the 
requirements of the so-called “preventive component” of the SGP. 
The latter aims to ensure that the fiscal policies of EU countries 
generate sufficient budgetary headroom for them to avoid 
excessive deficits. This means that Member States have to 
achieve budgetary balance in terms of the structural deficit net of 
temporary measures, with certain adjustments to take into account 
two factors which differ across countries: the need to reduce the 
public debt ratio below 60% of GDP and the size of the expected 
impact of population aging.3 This materialises in a medium-term 
objective (MTO) which, in the case of the Spanish economy, is set 
at 0% of GDP.
Spain has been subject to an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) 
since 2009 because of a budget deficit exceeding the limit of 3% 
of GDP. At the cut-off date of this Box, the European authorities 
confirmed that Spain qualified to exit this procedure (which will be 
repealed by the EU Council in early July), because in 2018 the 
general government deficit was below the 3% threshold 
(specifically, 2.5% of GDP) and this situation was judged to be 
sustainable in the future.4 Spain will exit the “corrective arm” and 
simultaneously enter the “preventive arm”.
On the available estimates, the structural deficit in 2018 stood 
above 2% of GDP (see Chart 1). Spain was thus still a long way 
from the medium-term structural budget balance objective (MTO), 
which, as mentioned above, has been set at 0% of GDP. Therefore, 
within the SGP “preventive component” framework, two 
requirements intended to ensure sufficient progress towards that 
objective will be activated. 
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SOURCES: 2019-2022 Stability Programme Update, spring forecast of the EC (May 2019) and Spanish economic forecast of the Banco de España (June 2019).
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1  For more details, see García-Perea and Gordo (2016) “Los mecanismos 
de supervisión presupuestaria de la UEM”, Boletín Económico of the 
Banco de España, 47-60.
2  See Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact – 2019 Edition.
3  It should be taken into account that the structural budget deficit is an 
unobservable variable and thus has to be estimated. For the purpose of 
the European procedure, it is estimated as the difference between the 
observed budget deficit and the cyclical deficit, stripping out the effect 
of temporary and exceptional factors. The cyclical deficit is calculated 
by applying the government revenue and spending elasticities to the 
output gap. The output gap is estimated using a methodology developed 
by the European Commission in conjunction with the Member States 
(see Havik et al. (2014) “The production function methodology for 
calculating potential growth rates and output gaps”, Economic Papers, 
535, European Commission).
4  Recommendation for a Council decision abrogating Decision 2009/417/
EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Spain.
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First, based on its level of debt (above 60% of GDP) and its cyclical 
position (positive output gap), Spain will have to make an annual 
adjustment in structural deficit terms of 0.65 percentage points of 
GDP in 2019 and 2020.5 Second, this structural adjustment must 
be compatible with the primary public spending growth rate below 
0.6% and 0.9% in 2019 and 2020, respectively.6
Additionally, holding public debt above the 60%-of-GDP threshold 
makes it necessary to reduce GDP at a sufficient pace to prevent 
Spain returning to the “corrective arm”, this time due to excessive 
debt (see Chart 2). Specifically, for a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 
60% not be considered excessive, the general rule is that this ratio 
must be reduced annually at one-twentieth of the difference from 
60%. However, in the three years following the repeal of the EDP 
(i.e. 2019-2021 in this case), Spain will remain in a transitional 
period which endows a certain degree of flexibility regarding the 
debt rule. This is because a minimum adjustment of the structural 
deficit is required, which ensures compliance with the debt 
criterion at the end of the transitional period.7 In particular, the 
minimum annual structural adjustment required of Spain for 2019 
would be 0.5 pp of GDP.8
However, on the Government’s latest estimates sent to the 
European Commission in April as part of the 2019-2022 Stability 
Programme Update, the structural balance for 2019 is expected to 
worsen by -0.2 pp of GDP (see Chart 1), as compared with the 
required improvements of +0.65 pp under the preventive arm and 
of 0.5 pp under the debt rule. Meanwhile, compared with the 
maximum allowed growth rate of eligible public spending of 0.6%, 
the projected growth of this variable for 2019 in the Stability 
Programme Update is 3.9%.
In this respect, although the Council should not make any 
statement on the Spanish fiscal policy stance until spring 2020, 
once the 2019 data have been published,9 the EU’s recent 
recommendation emphasised that, for the current year, there is a 
significant risk of deviation from the established requirements. 
Should this deviation materialise, the Council would recommend 
that Spain adopt the necessary adjustment measures, non-
compliance with which could even lead to a requirement to make 
a deposit of 0.2% of GDP.5  See the Recommendation for a Council recommendation on the National 
Reform Programme of Spain and delivering a Council opinion on the 
2018 and 2019 Stability Programmes of Spain. 
6  With a view to complying with the rule, public expenditure is defined 
excluding the interest burden and non-discretionary spending on 
unemployment benefits. Also excluded is EU programme expenditure 
which is fully offset by revenue from EU funds. Also, given its variability, 
government investment is not included at its annual amount, but rather 
as the average expenditure over four years.
7  This adjustment is known as the minimum linear structural adjustment 
(MLSA). Chart 2.1 shows various public debt paths for Spain in the 
period 2019-2021, including: that resulting from projections by the
SOURCES: 2019-2022 Stability Programme Update and Spanish economic forecast of the Banco de España (June 2019).
a 2019-2022 Stability Programme Update.
b Annual reduction by one-twentieth of the difference from 60%.
c Estimate of the maximum debt compatible with the requirements of the transition period.
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
STABILITY PROGRAMME BANCO DE ESPAÑA
GENERAL RULE (b) MAXIMUM DEBT (c)
1  DEBT
% of GDP Forecast
Chart 2
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
PRIMARY BALANCE INTEREST
CHANGE IN NOMINAL GDP DEFICIT - DEBT ADJUSTMENT
CHANGE IN DEBT
2  BREAKDOWN OF CHANGE IN DEBT (a)
% of GDP Forecast
   Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research of the Banco de 
España, that compatible with the minimum structural adjustment 
(calculated from the EU’s 2019 spring projections) and that resulting from 
application of the general rule.
8  See Assessment of the 2019 Stability Programme for Spain.
9  Compliance with the Council recommendations under the SGP 
“preventive component” is determined by an ex-post check, i.e. based 
on the data published after year-end (see “Vade Mecum on the Stability 
and Growth Pact – 2019 Edition”).
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Compliance with the fiscal rules set in the European budgetary 
governance process is a requirement which all member countries 
must meet in order to contribute to maintaining the macroeconomic 
stability of the euro area. But it also constitutes a desirable 
objective from the national standpoint, insofar as it helps to endow 
each country’s public finances with the resilience needed to 
withstand possible future downturns and ensure their long-term 
sustainability.
